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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-2678
__________
LOUIS GEORGE DOVER,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE TROOPER KYLE LASKOSKIE; PENNSYLVANIA
STATE TROOPER FRANK GAWEL; JOHN DOE SHIFT SUPERVISOR
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:21-cv-02953)
District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 25, 2022
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed May 19, 2022)
___________
OPINION*
___________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Following a traffic stop by Pennsylvania State Troopers, Louis Dover was
arrested and then charged with several state-law offenses, including carrying a firearm
without a license. Dover ultimately entered a negotiated plea of guilty to charges of DUI
and operating a vehicle without rear lights. The remaining charges were nolle prossed.
Thereafter, Dover filed suit in the District Court claiming, inter alia, that the State
Troopers unlawfully arrested him and seized his property (a firearm, ammunition, and
more). The District Court screened Dover’s operative pleading and determined under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that he failed to state a viable claim. The District Court
dismissed, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), certain of Dover’s
claims without prejudice to his filing a new case “if his underlying conviction is reversed,
vacated, or otherwise invalidated.” Dover v. Tallarico, DC Civ. No. 5:21-cv-02425, ECF
No. 7 at 2 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2021) (“Dover I”). The District Court dismissed Dover’s
due process claims, which sought the return of the seized property, without prejudice to
his seeking relief in state court. All other claims were dismissed with prejudice.
Dover did not appeal the judgment in Dover I. And it does not appear from the
record that he initiated litigation in state court, either to reclaim the seized property or to
have his convictions invalidated.
What Dover did do is file in the District Court a new civil rights action in order to,
in his words, “take[] on the due process claims which were dismissed without prejudice”
in Dover I. With the new action, Dover did not ask for the return of his property. Instead,
he asked for money damages, an investigation of the State Troopers, and an apology.
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The District Court screened Dover’s original complaint, and then screened his
amended complaint after granting leave to amend. The District Court sua sponte
dismissed Dover’s amended complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with prejudice, for
failure to state a viable claim. Generally speaking, the District Court ruled that the
doctrine of res judicata doomed Dover’s claims, which had already been raised against
the named defendants and resolved in Dover I. With regard to the due process claims in
particular, the District Court reminded Dover that he “may pursue the return of his
property in state court if appropriate.” Additionally, the District Court determined that
permitting further amendment of Dover’s pleading would be futile, so it declined to offer
leave to file a second amended complaint.
Dover appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the
District Court’s judgment. See Weimer v. Cnty. of Fayette, Pa., 972 F.3d 177, 186 (3d
Cir. 2020). Our review of a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is de novo. See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We review the District Court’s denial of
leave to amend for abuse of discretion, although we review de novo the determination
that amendment would be futile. See U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P.,
769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).
There was no error or abuse of discretion by the District Court in this case. In
Dover I, Dover’s due process claims were dismissed without prejudice to his ability to
pursue an action in state court under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 588(A)
(“A person aggrieved by a search and seizure, whether or not executed pursuant to a
warrant, may move for the return of the property on the ground that he or she is entitled
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to lawful possession thereof. Such motion shall be filed in the court of common pleas for
the judicial district in which the property was seized.”). The claims were not dismissed
without prejudice to refiling a virtually identical complaint in federal court.
On that note, we agree with the District Court’s res judicata analysis in full. “The
preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law,”
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008), and all the elements of federal-law res
judicata exist in Dover’s renewed civil rights case against the State Troopers, see
Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 726 F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir.
2013) (“A party seeking to invoke res judicata must establish three elements: ‘(1) a final
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and
(3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.’”) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, we are not troubled by the District Court’s application of the res
judicata doctrine—normally wielded by parties as an affirmative defense, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(c)—at the screening stage. Given the District Court’s familiarity with Dover’s
serially presented, previously litigated claims, dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) on res
judicata grounds was appropriate. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000)
(explaining that, “if a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented,
the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the defense [of res judicata] has
not been raised. This result is fully consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it
is not based solely on the defendant’s interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending
a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste”) (citation
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omitted); see also United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 749 (10th Cir. 2008); Wilson
v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1989).
Equally appropriate was the District Court’s decision to deny Dover further leave
to amend on the ground of futility. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Under Rule 15(a), futility of
amendment is a sufficient basis to deny leave to amend.”). A second amended complaint
in this case would have been, in effect, a sixth opportunity over the span of two cases and
three months to plead facts and claims related to the fateful traffic stop. The opportunity
would not have been meaningful, in light of the District Court’s prior rulings.
Finally, we observe that the arguments in Dover’s appellate brief are focused
almost exclusively on rulings made by the District Court in Dover I (e.g., the District
Court’s statute-of-limitations ruling). While Dover is in the right forum to make such
arguments, he has picked the wrong time to make them. If Dover wished to attack the
District Court’s judgment in Dover I, he should have timely appealed that judgment.
Accordingly, because the District Court’s decision dismissing Dover’s action on
res judicata grounds is sound, and because it would thus have been futile to allow Dover
to file a second amended complaint, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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